Arguments from the Concept of Particularization in Arabic Philosophy

ONE OF THE MOST distinctive concepts in Kalam philosophy is that of particularization (takhsis). In barest outline, it is the notion that when an object has a given characteristic but could conceivably have a different one, something must serve to particularize it, that is, to select the particular characteristic it does have from among all those that it might have.1 The concept can provide the nerve of a proof of the existence of God if it is shown, first, that the universe or its parts could conceivably have other characteristics, and, then, that only an agent with the attributes of a deity could select out the particular characteristics that the universe and its parts do have. In addition, the concept can provide the nerve of a proof of creation, should it be shown that whatever has a particular characteristic selected for itself cannot exist from all eternity and therefore must be generated. Both alShahrastani (d. 1153) and Averroes (d. 1198) name al-Juwayni as the originator of just such a combined proof of creation and the existence of God.2 In fact, as we shall see, Juwayni's innovation was very small, since all the elements of his proof were known before his time. After Juwayni, too, the proof underwent further development as two philosophers, al-Ghazali and Moses Maimonides, undertook successively more precise definitions of the legitimate application of the concept of particularization. Still, Juwayni does