Resilient Networked AC Microgrids Under Unbounded Cyber Attacks

This paper considers a cooperative and adversarial AC microgrid system consisting of cooperative leaders and inverters, as well as adversarial attackers. The attackers aim to destabilize the synchronization dynamics of the AC microgrid by first intercepting the communication channels, penetrating the local state feedback, and pretending to be a cooperative neighbor, and then initiating malicious attacks by launching unbounded injections. A fully distributed resilient control framework is offered for the secondary frequency regulation and voltage containment to ensure system stability and preserve bounded synchronization. In particular, a virtual resilient layer with hidden networks is developed to integrate with the original cyber-physical layer. The proposed resilient control framework is fully distributed without requiring any global information. A modified IEEE 34-bus test feeder benchmark system is emulated in a controller/hardware-in-the-loop environment, where the control objectives are met under different attack scenarios.