Weberian Closure Theory: A Contribution to the Ongoing Assessment

Neo-Weberian closure theory developed principally by Parkin appears at first glance to suffer from two opposing weaknesses that its central concept of exclusion is either too broad or too n-arrow. This paper demonstrates that these objections are spurious. It then uncovers several real problems which have not yet been examined by the critics of closure theory. These problems have to do with Parkin's conceptions of usurpation, of the withdrawal of services, and of property, as well as with the ambiguity in the politics of Parkin's closure theory. The paper corrects these weaknesses and clarifies this ambiguity and concludes that closure theory socorrected provides a promising framework for going beyond analyses focused narrowly on one particular means of domination and one particular set of monopolization and exclusion rules to a focus on monopolization and exclusion per se. It is to be expected that a new and highly original approach will be subjected to close critical scrutiny, especially if its presentation was embedded in a satirical critique of an established approach. Such has been the fate of Parkin'sl development of closure theory. Most evaluations have been favourable. An eminent Weberian scholar, Guenther Roth, states that 'Parkin has succeeded . . . in elaborating a genuinely neo-Weberian position'.2 Rex concludes that Parkin's discussion of closure . . . illuminates many of the issues of British politics in the sixties. And his notion of double closure . . . seems to me to be a theoretical notion of the first importance.... I believe that the importance of this concept in the field of ethnic and race relations is enormous and can be developed even further than Parkin thinks it can.3 Wrong judges that 'Parkin's use of these concepts [closure, exclusion, The British Journal of Sociology Volume XXXVII Number I This content downloaded from 157.55.39.162 on Thu, 11 Aug 2016 05:47:57 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms