This study confirms and enlarges upon a partial explanation of the dominance of lawyers in American politics: that lawyers are advantaged by having legal skills which give them a monopoly over one important route of advancement-the cluster of offices related to the judicial system. Using data from interviews conducted in 1957 with state legislators in four states and original data on the interviewees' subsequent political careers we find: (1) that lawyers move from the state legislature to other offices at a much greater rate than nonlawyers and that the difference is the result of their ability to advance to lawyers-only positions; (2) that a major reason for the overrepresentation of lawyers in American state legislatures is that legislative service has a greater political career value for lawyers than for nonlawyers; (3) that lawyers who move from the state legislature to a lawyers-only position tend to stay there; (4) that lawyers do not invest appreciably more time in their political careers than nonlawyers; but (5) lawyers are much more likely than nonlawyers to achieve their political career goals.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Hain et al. (1975) studied this question.