Personality, Disorder, and Personality Disorder: Towards a More Rational Conceptualization

It is both more difficult and more pleasurable to comment on an article with which one fundamentally agrees than an article that one approaches critically. It is more difficult because the content of a critique is dictated largely by objectionable aspects of the target article, whereas the content of a supportive review must be broader and more innovative to avoid redundancy. This same need for more expansive comment entails a freedom of expression that also affords the greater degree of pleasure. From the outset, therefore, let us make clear that we agree with the fundamental thrust of Ryder and Bagby's arguments (1999) against the inclusion of depressive personality disorder (DPD) in future editions of the DSM. If there is a flaw in their arguments and conclusions, it is that they are too narrow and might be effectively extended to encompass many more disorders—on both Axes I and II—than dysthymia and DPD. Accordingly, in these comments, we articulate a more comprehensive case.