Tort Decisions and Campaign Dollars

There has recently been growing concern over the massive infusion of special interest dollars in state judicial elections. Commentators worry that these contributions may undermine the public's confidence in the operation and impartiality of the judicial system, or worse, “buy” the decision of the successful judicial candidate. The purpose of this analysis is to determine the extent to which there is good cause to worry. It examines contribution patterns for, and the decisional behavior of, the state supreme court justices on the Alabama, Kentucky, and Ohio courts who have had electoral contests in the 1990s. Results indicate that worries over the American bench being “for sale” have some traction. Under electoral pressures, the justices do appear to position themselves to appeal more to their contributors. This effect is not enduring, however. Whatever relationships exist between contributions to judicial candidates and their decisional behavior are short‐term. Following his or her election, a justice's decision‐making shows no signs of being influenced by interest group contributions.