European Economic Decision-Making Policy: Progress or Paralysis?

Voting in the European Union European economic decision-making policy: progress or paralysis? Using methods that determine voting power, this article examines the shifting powers of member countries within the Council of Ministers of the European Union, as well as its relationship with the Commission. The main focus is upon the effect of enlargement of the Union on individual countries' influence, and how they are likely to react. The main result is that, facing a dilution of their power, countries will increasingly have an incentive to link decisions into package deals. One implication of this tendency is an erosion of the independence of the Commission. Another implication is that the package deals will reflect to a larger extent pure national interests. The article explores ways of alleviating this likely evolution. The obvious idea of reducing the current overrepresentation of the smaller nations will not solve the problem. One solution is to apply lower majority requirements. The risk is that such a move would increase the Commission's power in both initiating and pushing through its own agenda. This risk can be mitigated by giving member states the ability to bypass the Commission and initiate their own legislation. Such a move would probably also require strengthening the role of the European Parliament as a counterbalance to the Commission. — Alan Kirman and Mika Widgren