Mortgage origination fraud

I n the current work, "Mortgage origination fraud and the global economic crisis: A criminological analysis," Nguyen and Pontell (2010, this issue) find three root causes of the mortgage crisis that launched the Great Recession.First, fraud made easier by inadequate regulation created the ideal climate for deceptive dealings in the solicitation, origination, financing, sales, and servicing of mortgage loans.Second, indiscriminate use of alternative loan products, like subprime and alternative A-paper (Alt-A) instruments-whether for those who easily would have qualified for higher quality products or for those who should not have qualified for a mortgage loan under any circumstances-were the earliest and most costly defaults in U.S. housing history.Taking the first and second findings together, Nguyen and Pontell suggest a compounding effect of one finding on the other.Finally, Nguyen and Pontell (2010) argue that there is a lack of accountability in the mortgage lending industry in the form of regulation, enforcement, and governing mechanisms, which allowed for the rapid escalation of mortgage fraud.The absence of accountability, however, is symptomatic of a larger structural issue.In short, the credit industry is a labyrinthine structure with numerous participating entities (e.g., borrowers, brokers, lenders, appraisers, servicers, ratings agencies, and investment firms).This complex structure leaves the industry rife with opportunities for fraud writ large.As Nguyen and Pontell point out, the credit industry's compensation policies and practices ultimately were too far removed from the actual lending transaction.In this essay, we first review the research and the market-based linkages to Nguyen and Pontell's (2010) principal findings.We then analyze Nguyen and Pontell's recommended mortgage lending industry changes, including (a) tightening loan qualification standards and redressing loan origination compensation policies; (b) recognizing the potential for insider fraud and using greater transparency, as well as stricter governance, to mitigate fraud likelihood; and (c)