Empire by design: US hegemony and the structural politics of the IMF and World Bank

Purpose This paper examines how US hegemony is embedded in the institutional design of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) and how this structural power shapes lending, conditionality, and development trajectories, especially in the Global South. Design/Methodology/Approach The study adopts a qualitative comparative design combining document analysis, critical discourse analysis, and historical case studies. It examines governance structures, quota and voting arrangements, institutional reports, and policy documents related to the IMF and World Bank. In addition, the study analyzes the institutional language of “stability,” “reform,” and “development” to explore how policy conditionalities are legitimized within global financial governance. Comparative historical case studies—including Chile, Egypt, Zaire/DRC, Poland, and Vietnam—are used to illustrate how institutional rules and geopolitical considerations have shaped lending practices, policy demands, and domestic reform trajectories across different political and historical contexts. Findings US influence operates mainly through durable institutional mechanisms rather than episodic coercion, including disproportionate voting power and de facto veto capacity, leadership-selection conventions, and administrative proximity that normalizes US preferences. Lending allocation and conditionality frequently align with US strategic priorities, rewarding allies and constraining dissenting states, while promoting neoliberal reform packages that narrow policy autonomy, reshape state–society relations, and reproduce dependency through hierarchical integration into the global economy. Research limitations/Implications Limited access to internal deliberations and uneven interview availability constrain direct observation of informal influence channels. Future research could expand the comparative scope through archival research, additional case studies, and deeper examination of institutional decision-making processes. Practical/Social implications Governance reforms that rebalance quotas, increase transparency, and strengthen accountability may reduce asymmetries; borrowers can diversify financing and protect vulnerable groups during adjustment. Originality/Value The paper integrates critical political economy with qualitative comparative analysis to explain how institutional design and geopolitical interests intersect within the IMF and World Bank.