Facing US Extraterritorial Pressure: American Troops in Foreign Courts during the Cold War

The United States often applies its laws to conduct or persons in foreign countries. How do these countries respond to US extraterritorial pressure? This study examines a central case of extraterritoriality: the protection of US troops from criminal justice in troop-hosting countries. I argue that greater security dependence on the United States brings hosts to comply with US pressure—when such compliance receives limited public attention. This argument is tested through a microlevel analysis of host countries’ treatment of US personnel who committed criminal offenses during the Cold War (1954–70). The results suggest that in countries dependent on US-provided security, American troops were less likely to face trial. Yet if troops indeed stood trial, the host’s dependence on the United States did not bias verdicts or sentences, since those were public. The data also show that the involvement of US troops in crime was far greater than previously known.