Oil rents and political breakdown in patrimonial states: Algeria in comparative perspective

Studies of oil-exporting states within the comparative political economy of development literature maintain that oil structures political, as well as economic, outcomes. Hence, political ‘breakdown’, when it occurs, is largely a function of oil. Through an in-depth consideration of the case of Algeria, this article seeks to nuance sectoral analyses that favour structural explanations. It offers two suggestions: first, that in authoritarian states with deeply divided societies, the seeds of breakdown tend to precede oil-based development and derive, as in non-oil-exporting states, from problems related to the construction of the nation; and second, that the decisions of political leaders, whether they relate to nation-building or to utilising oil rents, are at least as important as structural variables in explaining outcomes. This article showcases an argument that is being extended to other oil-exporting states that have experienced breakdown.