Credibility and World Power: Exploring the Psychological Dimension in Postwar American Diplomacy

Throughout the post-World War II period, American leaders have explained, defended, and justified a wide range of diplomatic and military decisions by invoking the hallowed principle of credibility. They have argued with remarkable consistency, privately as well as publicly, that demonstrating the credibility of American power and American commitments ranked among the most critical of all U.S. foreign policy objectives. An elusive concept that defies precise definition, credibility has typically connoted for American decision makers a blend of resolve, reliability, believability, and decisiveness; equally important, it has served as a code word for America's image and reputation. In an inherently dangerous and unstable world, according to this line of thought, peace and order depend to a great extent on Washington's ability to convince adversaries and allies alike of its firmness, determination, and dependability. Credibility has had a double meaning for American diplomatic and defense officials. They have been convinced that just as threats need to be credible to deter potential aggressors, so too must promises be credible to reassure friends. In a recent reflection of the first concern, former President Richard M. Nixon contended that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, if allowed to stand, would erode American credibility and thus embolden other aggressors. "If we fail to roll back [Saddam Hussein's] aggression—peacefully if possible, by force if necessary—no potential aggressor in the future will be deterred by warnings from the U.S. or by U.N. resolutions," Nixon declared.1 His logic, and his very choice of words, doubtless sound familiar to those well versed in the history of American Cold War diplomacy—even though pundits quickly dubbed the Persian Gulf imbroglio the first crisis of "the post-Cold War era."