Theoretical model reveals how officer incentives complicate administrative delegation in policing, suggesting trade-offs between operational discretion and accountability.
A primary challenge for the administration of public safety is the implementation of policy that facilitates effective policing and satisfies political pressure over outcomes. I develop a model of police administration that captures the tension between policing outcomes and policing tactics. The model evaluates how police officers’ incentives to violate policy limits on their behavior complicate delegation by leaders. Police leaders are motivated to provide discretion so officers may use appropriate tactics for whatever situation they face but also motivated to ensure that police do not abuse discretion and comply with limits on their behavior. I use the model to study the effects of political control of policing policy and insulation of police officers from accountability.
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Tom Clark (2024) studied this question.
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