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Conceptual paper develops the cascade framework to explain civilian cybercrime vulnerability during conflict, suggesting a need for prevention strategies.
War rarely stays contained; like dominoes, its effects can fall far beyond the battlefield. This conceptual paper develops the Geopolitical to Cybercrime Cascade Framework (GCCF) to explain how geopolitical conflict may generate downstream civilian cybercrime vulnerability in noncombatant settings. Weaving together insights from cybercrime research, hybrid warfare scholarship, and critical infrastructure studies, the framework shows how supply chain disruption, public anxiety, misinformation, and criminal adaptation can converge to create conditions favorable to crisis-themed fraud. The GCCF is illustrated through a structured case analysis of the 2026 US-Israel-Iran conflict, focusing on how disruption in and around the Strait of Hormuz shaped civilian vulnerability in India during the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) crisis. Rather than offering definitive causal proof, the paper proposes a conceptual model to explain how distant geopolitical shocks can travel through everyday infrastructures and decision-making environments, exposing ordinary civilians to cybercrime-related harms. It also identifies misinformation as a key amplifier within this cascade and considers policy implications for anticipatory warning systems and crisis-period cybercrime prevention.
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Lazarus et al. (2026) studied this question.
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