Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation

During the decade of the 1970s, three largely unanticipated developments – the rapid growth of nuclear power in the United States and abroad, increasing terrorist actions and threats around the world, and the testing of a nuclear explosive by India – triggered major controversies over U.S. policies for protecting nuclear plants and materials. The debate gave greatly increased visibility to the problems of domestic and international “safeguards,” which was the term applied to preventing the theft, loss, or diversion of nuclear materials or the sabotage of nuclear plants. The central issue was whether the expanded use of nuclear power to meet world energy demands would lead to accelerated proliferation of nuclear weapons among nation-states, or worse, to terrorist acquisition of a nuclear bomb. In the United States, the federal agencies responsible for the safety of civilian nuclear programs, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and, after it was abolished, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), responded by substantially tightening domestic safeguards requirements in nuclear power plants and in the transportation of nuclear materials, despite vocal complaints from the nuclear industry. The international aspects of the problem proved to be even more controversial, particularly the development of a policy that governed the export of nuclear fuel and other materials to foreign countries for nuclear power production. The debate over exports created sharp conflicts between Congress and the White House over the impact of authorizing or withholding the shipment of nuclear materials. It also caused tensions between the United States and other nations over questions that touched on national sovereignty, international politics, energy sufficiency, commercial competition, and the reliability of the United States as a supplier for the nuclear power needs of foreign countries.