Randomized trial explores board characteristics' impact on tax aggressiveness in listed firms, suggesting improvement strategies.
Corporate tax aggressiveness remains a critical governance concern because of its implications for corporate accountability, fiscal sustainability, and stakeholder confidence. Although tax planning is a legitimate business strategy, excessive tax aggressiveness may expose firms to reputational, regulatory, and financial risks. This study investigates the effect of board characteristics on corporate tax aggressiveness among listed industrial goods firms in Nigeria. Specifically, the study examines whether board independence and board size significantly influence firms' cash effective tax rate (CETR) while controlling for firm size. An ex post facto research design was adopted using balanced panel data obtained from the annual reports of nine industrial goods companies listed on the Nigerian Exchange Group (NGX) for the period 2016–2023.all listed industrial goods firms with complete data for the period. Report the Hausman test result (e.g., p-value) and state whether random effects were supported. Add a sentence on robustness checks, such as alternative tax aggressiveness measures or clustered standard errors. The findings reveal that board independence is negatively associated with corporate tax aggressiveness but the relationship is statistically insignificant. Likewise, board size demonstrates a negative and insignificant influence on CETR, indicating that although larger and more independent boards may discourage aggressive tax practices, their influence remains weak within the sampled firms. Firm size also exhibits no statistically significant effect on corporate tax aggressiveness. The study concludes that board characteristics alone are insufficient to significantly constrain aggressive corporate tax behaviour in Nigeria's industrial goods sector. It recommends strengthening board expertise, improving regulatory enforcement, and enhancing tax governance practices to promote sustainable corporate tax compliance and long-term corporate value.enhancing board monitoring capacity through expertise and independence.
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Ojo et al. (2026) studied this question.
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