Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
On 30 July 2009 the New Zealand Law Commission released its 279-page Issues Paper on the Reform of New Zealand's Liquor Laws [1] . The Law Commission is an independent Crown Entity responsible for reviewing New Zealand's laws and providing law reform advice to the Government. The President of the Commission, Sir Geoffrey Palmer, in his foreword wrote: The Law Commission project to review the law on the sale and supply of liquor aims to examine the whole scene from top-to-toe for the first time since Sir George Laking and his committee reported in 1986. (piii) The call for the review was prompted by community concern following the fatal shooting of shopkeeper Navtej Singh in his Auckland liquor store in June 2008. Prior to Singh's death, in response to increasing public concern about the negative impact of alcohol in New Zealand society, the Associate Minister of Justice, Lianne Dalziel, made several speeches saying that a comprehensive review was needed. After the shooting, she introduced a Bill to the Parliament designed to deal with some of the more urgent issues and at the same time announced the Law Commission's comprehensive review. The Commission was consulted and agreed that a review was required. Notably, the president of the Commission had been the architect of the Sale of Liquor Act 1989, which dramatically liberalised the sale of alcohol. The review has frequently been described as a ‘once in a generation’ opportunity to improve alcohol policy in New Zealand [2] . The Issues Paper outlines the problems and the range of options available to deal with them and gives some ‘tentative’ suggestions on how New Zealand might deal with the problems. In this editorial we cast a critical eye over the Commission's suggestions. The Commission is to be applauded on a comprehensive review and for adopting a principle of underpinning policy recommendations with research evidence where possible. Regrettably, on several key issues (e.g. on the effects of ‘one way door’ policies in licensed premises), we lack sufficient evidence to guide policy. In the absence of evidence there is a risk that the Commission will recommend no policy change. We urge the Commission to formally adopt the precautionary principle, with emphasis on: (i) taking preventive action in the face of uncertainty; and (ii) shifting the burden of proof to the proponents of the activity. The precautionary principle provides a healthier alternative to the reactive basis of much public health and environmental policy where evidence of harm must be established beyond reasonable doubt before action is taken to prevent harm [3] . The Commission appropriately concludes that raising the price of alcohol is ‘. . . among the most potent instruments in reducing alcohol related-harm . . .’ (p. 175) and it therefore argues there is a case for increasing excise tax. The paper also suggests that there is a case for reducing tax on low-alcohol products. In our view there is a strong circumstantial case for a reduced tax on low-alcohol beer. Low-alcohol (< 3% alcohol by volume) and mid-strength (3.0–3.5%) beer is an Australian public health success story. It accounts for 26% of the Australian beer market [4] and provides a relatively safe option in a society in which beer remains the beverage of choice for the heaviest consuming segment of the population, namely, young men. Low-alcohol beer products are extremely uncommon in New Zealand and this is almost certainly due to the lack of a preferential taxation regime. Consideration should also be given to lower taxes on other low-alcohol products, for example, low-alcohol wine and low-alcohol varieties of ready-to-drink spirits. The Commission has cited the New Zealand evidence concerning the negative effects of lowering the minimum purchase age from 20 to 18 in 1999 [5] , [6] . The Commission has, however, declared a preference for a split age: 18 for on-licence consumption and 20 for off-licence purchase. We have previously commented on the folly of this intuitively appealing compromise [7] . The logic of a split age seems to be that if 18- to 19-year-olds are drinking in licensed premises they will be safer than if drinking in other settings. This is an assertion often heard from the hospitality industry for which the split age would clearly be commercially advantageous. Assertions should not serve as the basis of public policy, particularly when there is good research evidence to guide legislative reform. New Zealand evidence shows the opposite of what the industry claims: (i) many licensed premises are not safe [8] ; and (ii) there continues to be a high incidence of drinking to intoxication in licensed premises [9] . The Commission says it ‘favours leaving the main bulk of the regulation to the Advertising Standards Authority’. The research evidence on the deleterious effects of exposure to alcohol advertising is more compelling than the Issues Paper suggests [10] . The Issues Paper appears to reflect a view that regulation of advertising would be unacceptable to politicians or the public. We urge the Commission not to shy away from politically unpalatable advice. The current arrangement permits the extensive promotion of alcohol to young people, many of whom are watching television after 8:30 pm when alcohol advertising is permitted to commence. There are clearly insufficient controls on the content of advertising, in which this psychoactive, addictive substance is presented as a glamorous consumer product [11] . The Commission should take a strong position, promoting a restriction on broadcast alcohol advertising along the lines of the Loi Evin in France, which does not permit the glamorous presentation of alcohol [12] . The Commission states that it ‘will not trespass’ into the area of labelling because it is subject to the control of the Food Standards Authority of Australia and New Zealand. Why? The fact that packaged alcohol is not subject to the requirement for nutrition and ingredients labelling like all other packaged food and drink products is a striking anomaly. There is no evidence one way or the other on whether such labelling has an effect on drinking behaviour [13] ; however, in an era of consumer sovereignty, it is hard to understand why a bottle of cola has to display ingredients and nutritional information while a bottle of bourbon and cola does not. There is evidence that the community, including heavy drinkers, strongly supports compulsory labelling [13] . It is also possible that some consumers will drink less alcohol once they are aware of how many calories there are in alcoholic beverages. There is research evidence concerning the effects of warning labels suggesting that they affect consumers' knowledge and attitudes, but there is no evidence of behaviour change [14] . It is hard to imagine how the effects of warning labels on drinking behaviour might be robustly determined. There is, however, enough evidence that they may help, they are unlikely to cause harm, and they could be justified on the basis of the precautionary principle. We urge the Commission to recommend that the Foods Standards Authority of Australia and New Zealand require that beverages containing alcohol include nutritional and ingredients labelling. In addition, we encourage the Commission to recommend health warning labels as per the recommendations of Wilkinson & Room [14] . There is new evidence from New Zealand suggesting that receiving alcohol industry sponsorship, especially in the form of free or discounted alcohol, increases hazardous drinking among sports participants [15] . The research also suggests that the practice of alcohol industry sponsorship is pervasive at all levels of sport in New Zealand. In a recent editorial a case was made for the banning of such sponsorship arrangements [16] . The primary objection to such a ban is that community sport needs the money. However, alcohol industry sponsorship could be replaced with funds from a hypothecated (i.e. dedicated) tax similar to that levied on tobacco for funding community activities. An obvious model for this arrangement in New Zealand is the Health Sponsorship Council. The Commission should take a bold position on this important element of New Zealand's alcohol problem by recommending a ban on sponsorship of sport. Important policy changes in relation to supply-side, demand-side and problem limitation strategies occur frequently in New Zealand as in many countries. There is presently no formal mechanism for the evaluation of these changes. As a consequence, we often find ourselves in a cycle of disputing even the basic facts regarding the effects of policies. As every policy change produces winners and losers, and everyone pays the opportunity cost of adopting ineffective policies, there is also an ethical imperative to measure effectiveness. It is critical that important policy changes are subject to independent evaluation that has been planned well in advance of the change. Independent research requires contestable, peer-reviewed funding to research providers external to government who do not have conflicts of interest, and under the condition that findings be published in peer-reviewed scientific journals (see [17] for a discussion of this in relation to the government's failure to prospectively evaluate the effects of the 1999 reduction in the minimum purchase age). We encourage the Commission to recommend that a requirement for independent evaluation be embedded within legislative changes concerning alcohol. Public submissions were called for on the Issues Paper and at closing date the Commission had received approximately 3000. This is an indication of a very strong public interest in the issues traversed by the Issues Paper. The Commission will make its final recommendations to the Minister of Justice in March 2010. The Minister has indicated that there may be a Bill in the house by mid 2010. The big question is whether the Government will have the courage to show strong leadership in seeking to reduce alcohol-related harm. They will need to adopt policies that have a high probability of being effective, and that, for some constituencies (e.g. the liquor and advertising industries), and a portion of voters, will be unpopular. For example, increasing excise tax is arguably the most effective strategy, but it may be unpopular as voters seek to recover from the recession. Conscience voting has traditionally been applied to alcohol Bills as a way of dealing with, and disowning, the contentious nature of such legislation [18] . In a conscience vote Members of Parliament cast their votes free from the usual expectation of party discipline. In May 2009, the Law Commission published its advice on this practice with regard to alcohol [19] . It found that conscience voting can reduce the quality and effectiveness of alcohol laws and increase the chance that they are amended, resulting in legislation that lacks coherence and logic. It considered alcohol too important a social issue to be treated this way, and concluded that there are compelling grounds for dispensing with this historical practice. However, whether the new legislation will be subject to a conscience vote is determined by the caucus of each party and not the government. As yet none of the political parties have acted on the Commission's recommendation. Such action is a necessary first step in showing the required leadership to reduce alcohol-related harm.
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Kypri et al. (2010) studied this question.
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