Judicial review in administrative contracts in Egypt: evidence from administrative court rulings in Government Tenders and Bids Law disputes

This paper examines the role of administrative court review in disputes related to Egypt’s Government Tenders and Bids Law. It assesses whether government authorities are more likely to receive a favorable ruling, whether they receive a larger fraction of their claims, and whether administration-initiated claims face a shorter dispute resolution time. I use rulings data from 472 cases to construct variables for dispute characteristics and outcomes. Analysis shows that, compared to contractors, government authorities have higher odds of receiving favorable awards of both the main disputed values and composite claims (including interest or compensation). Plaintiff identity, on the other hand, does not affect the odds of being awarded a compensation or interest claim. Moreover, administrative authorities, on average, receive a larger fraction of their claims and the difference increases for composite claims and when plaintiffs demand interest or compensation when filing. With respect to dispute resolution time, contractor-initiated cases are shorter on average and economy-wide variables and administrative court restructuring affect dispute resolution time in contrast to their negligible effect on expected dispute outcome. The analysis further suggests that plaintiffs are partially successful in applying law principles when claiming interest and compensation to improve dispute outcomes. However, bias in favor of administrative authorities remains, which is likely the outcome of a combination of the discretionary room that the law grants administrative authorities and the discretion that courts have in applying Civil Law principles governing compensation and interest awards.