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The preferences of politicians are crucial in a representative democracy. In order to change policy, voters must elect politicians who prefer to do so. Party affiliation may signal preferences to voters, but preferences are also shaped by institutional factors, such as committee membership and social background. This article assesses whether political, institutional or social background explanations best explain spending preferences, based on a survey of 1,200 Danish municipal councillors. Simulations of the relative effect of such variables show that party membership is the most important explanation of spending preferences. Social background, including age, gender, occupation and education, has limited impact, but female, young and better‐educated politicians are likely to prefer higher spending. The committee structure is more important. Standing committee membership and seniority have a substantial positive effect on preferences. Although spending advocacy does exist, guardians are harder to find. Even though the members of the economic committee are responsible for the overall economic situation, spending preferences among these politicians are not systematically different.
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Søren Serritzlew (2003) studied this question.
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