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Analytical framework develops CBDC design and architecture, highlighting privacy and institutional implications.
This paper develops an analytical framework for the joint design of central bank digital currency (CBDC) and its underlying ledger architecture. We treat a digital monetary system as a tuple M = (S, R, C, I)—supply state, rule set, circulation parameters, and incentive structure—and read centralized, permissioned-distributed, and hybrid ledger designs as parameter settings on M. Two analytical propositions extend the framework. Proposition A locates a threshold above which a retail holding cap ceases to bind, building on the Brunnermeier–Niepelt neutrality condition. Proposition B characterizes the fixed point of the rule-update map under bounded policy shocks and reports its mean-square convergence rate. Each proposition is paired with a stylized numerical exercise; neither claims empirical validation. A comparative section then traces how the institutional environments of Singapore, the European Union, the United States, and China fix admissible regions in M before any architectural choice. What we contribute is a parametric vocabulary for techno-institutional comparison, not a new architecture; the principal limitation is the absence of pilot-data calibration, which we list as the highest-priority continuation.
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