Dependence Power, Legitimacy, and Tactical Choice

This study examines the impact of dependence power and legitimate authority on evaluations of various tactics in a two-party conflict. In a role-play vignette study we asked 320 college students to take the position of a subordinate in a conflict with a manager, and to evaluate their own likelihood of adopting six options suggested by Bacharach and Lawler's analysis of dependence and tactical choice and by Zelditch and Walker's legitimacy approach to stability: threat to leave, coalition with other subordinates, appealing to a higher authority, appealing to a higher authority in a coalition, persuasion, and conflict avoidance. The factorial design manipulated subordinates' and superordinates' alternatives, as well as endorsement and authorization of the superordinate. Results generally support our predictions on the relationships between dependence and legitimacy dimensions on the one hand, and specific tactical evaluations on the other. They show that threat to leave is related directly to self and other alternatives, while evaluations of coalition formation, appeal to a higher authority, and a combination of these two tactics are related directly to the legitimacy dimensions. Evaluations of conflict avoidance are related directly to both dependence and legitimacy; persuasion is viewed as a more likely option regardless of variation in the dependence and legitimacy dimensions.