Balance of the Trade-off Between Accountability and National Security: A Case Study of Yonaguni Island, Okinawa, Japan

This paper examines how the dysfunction of accountability mechanisms, caused by information asymmetry, hinders consensus-building among actors in the context of establishing NIMBYs with high levels of confidentiality and technical expertise. As a case study, this paper analyzes developments on Yonaguni Island, one of Japan’s border islands, regarding the invitation of the Japan Self-Defense Forces – a case that may be considered a deviation from conventional NIMBY issues. Initially, the local municipality and some residents of Yonaguni Island jointly invited the JSDF, and consensus was reached through a local referendum; however, after the establishment of the Camp, even some former proponents began to express doubts. This paper categorizes the relevant actors as those who impose accountability (holders) and those upon whom accountability is imposed (holdees), and analyzes the extent to which the duty of explanation has been fulfilled. The analysis shows that when a holdee responds to a holder’s request for explanation by providing information and fulfilling their explanatory duty, consensus-building is fostered; conversely, when sufficient information is not provided by the holdee to the holder, the resulting expansion of information asymmetry poses a risk of consensus breakdown.