Value-deflationist self-control

On the standard conception of self-control, self-control entails the resolution of a motivational conflict in favour of the option ranked better, loftier, or otherwise more valuable, and behaving accordingly. Sometimes, however, we appear to use self-control under ambivalence, or against our better judgment. In this paper, I seek to eliminate the apparent paradox induced by these cases by defending and developing a value-deflationist conception of self-control. For the value-deflationist conception of self-control endorsed in this paper, self-control is that which is enacted to align one’s behaviour with intention in the face of a competing motivation. I develop the view further by showing that errant and ambivalent cases of self-control are not mere anomalies or theoretical curiosities but instead are important for understanding disruptions of agency due to motivational-executive double binds, where agents struggle both to rank options and to steer their behaviour. Adopting a value-deflationist account allows us to describe how ambivalence undermines self-control. Value-deflationism about self-control has faced a range of criticisms, such as the criticism that errant cases would turn out to be standard cases under a different description. The paper responds to these criticisms, showing that attempts to reconcile these cases with the standard conception fall short.