Diverse but united: elites and public goods in early 20th century Ecuador

How does elite composition affect public goods provision? While existing research emphasizes mass-level diversity or inequality between elites and citizens, elites themselves often exerted disproportionate influence over investment decisions, especially where democratic institutions were weak. This paper examines how internal elite composition shaped public goods provision in early 20th-century Ecuador. It argues that elite heterogeneity – measured as the number of distinct elite families within a locality – is associated with higher levels of provision. Using historical records from 1908, the author constructs a parish-level index of heterogeneity based on more than 1,800 elite surnames and matches it to a 1914 inventory of state-owned assets. The results reveal a robust positive relationship, even after accounting for geography, population, wealth and elite density. Historical evidence further suggests that where elites were diverse yet embedded in broader social and economic networks, they were more likely to support collective investments. The findings underscore elite composition as an important source of variation in state capacity.