When do non-evidential considerations trump evidence as the consciously preferred foundation for belief? The role of commitment to epistemic rationality

People sometimes view it as justified for others (and for themselves) to consciously adopt beliefs that are inconsistent with the available evidence, provided that the belief is thought to promote a moral good. In the present research we examine whether this phenomenon is observed regardless of people’s level of commitment to epistemic rationality. Two studies show that how much people value epistemic rationality predicts more favourable evaluations of other people’s evidence-based beliefs, and more unfavourable evaluations of beliefs formed based on non-evidential considerations (Study 1–2). The only circumstance where a strong commitment to epistemic rationality did not favour the evidence-based belief was when it required racial stereotyping of a man based on local crime statistics. This exception was not attributable to elevated Care/harm concerns, did not depend on whether the target was black or white (Study 3 A), or on whether stereotyping was based on skin colour or clothing (Study 3B).