Preference for Inequality

In studying equality, the question is not just whether people prefer equality or not, but the conditions under which they will be willing to accept departures front equality of opportunity in order to obtain equality of outcome. Rawls has recently argued that people should be more likely to do so in an original position in which they do not know whether they themselves will be advantaged or disadvantaged in society. The present study asked 80 three-person groups of undergraduates to judge equal and unequal task assignments for their groups. All groups knew that their members differed in ability, but only half the groups knew who was high and who was low. In half the groups the unequal task assignment resulted in a net gain for the high-ability person and in half, a net gain for the low-ability person, either without cost to anyone, or at the expense of the person at the other end of the distribution. Knowledge of positions made no difference when subjects were considering inequalities that would not cost anyone anything, or inequalities that would benefit the high-ability person, but made a substantial difference for inequality that would benefit the low-ability person at the expense of the high-ability person. In this case, subjects were much more willing to endorse the inequality when they did not know their positions than when they did. It is suggested that, where possible, we should ask people to make moral decisions before they know with certainty their own standing and likely outcome in the situation.