The ever-shifting problem of consciousness

The aim of this paper is to develop a new understanding of what the “problem of consciousness” is and to indicate why it cannot be solved conclusively. It is argued that the problem cannot be captured by a single question, such as the currently popular “How does the brain produce consciousness?” From a broader point of view, the problem of consciousness is a “problem-in-repetition” in the sense of Gilles Deleuze: that is, a series of questions that replace each other in different theoretical frameworks. The problem will shift when the theory changes, but it will not go away. A brief survey of mind–body theories given in this paper includes property dualism, materialism, substance dualism, eliminativism, idealism, panpsychism, and dual-aspect theory. We will probably never have a final theory of consciousness. But as a final theory would have to describe some kind of “reality,” this issue also depends on general ontological assumptions. Drawing on Henri Bergson, Deleuze suggests an ontology of “actuality” and “virtuality” that helps to explain why any reality and hence any theory of consciousness will leave room for further questions.