The Construction of Market Institutions in Russia: A View from the Institutionalism of Polanyi

After a decade of economic transition in Russia there is still no theoretic analysis which coherently interprets it. Various analytic approaches have been tried. The ones that stand out as important are those which have stemmed from a neoclassic (orthodox) point of view. According to these studies, the destruction of the traditional institutions related to central planning guarantees the appearance of a market economy. This destruction permits economic agents to interact freely, generating what is known as an economic market (Aslund 1995; Blanchard 1997; Lipton and Sachs 1990). Nevertheless, this focus has presented serious limitations in explaining the difficulties of extending and consolidating reforms and, therefore, their positive results.' Attempts have been made to explain a part of the problems that have appeared by considering certain political factors such as corruption (Shleifer 1997; Shleifer and Vishny 1993, 1994). Nevertheless, such considerations have not succeeded in resolving the problems of the orthodox focus. The neoclassic focus has been answered by evolutionist analysis, but frequently the latter has been characterized more as a criticism of the orthodox conception than as a perception of any new and specific ways to tackle this economic phenomenon. It is appropriate to note, however, that evolutionary economists have suggested some analysis of a global character (Murrell 1992a and 1992b; Koslowski 1992). In certain cases