This study estimates an appropriate loan-to-value (LTV) ratio for the Jeonse deposit return guarantee. While a downward adjustment of the LTV ratio is necessary to ensure the sustainability of the guarantee scheme, such a policy change may increase the risk of Jeonse deposit non-repayment by landlords in the housing market. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct an ex-ante assessment of whether the potential increase in landlords’ non-repayment risk induced by a lower LTV is socially acceptable. To this end, this paper proposes an analytical framework consisting of “policy shock coverage – market-level Reverse Jeonse risk – landlords’ non-repayment risk.” This framework differs from existing studies by distinguishing between Jeonse-equivalent deposit and actual rental deposit in monthly rent contracts, and by explicitly accounting for landlords’ self-financed repayment in cases of Reverse Jeonse. Under an extreme scenario that maximizes landlords’ non-repayment risk, the appropriate LTV ratio is estimated to be 70%. Even if the LTV is lowered from the current 90% to 70%, the estimated landlords’ non-repayment risk (3.1%) remains below the delinquency rate of household loans at savings banks (4.6%) as of the end of June 2025.
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Hoobin Lee (2026) studied this question.
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