Changes in the regulatory environment in China since 2002 with respect to related-party disclosure were a sign that China wished to make its corporate sector more transparent and accountable. It was expected that the introduction of mandatory disclosure might also lead to higher levels of voluntary disclosure than had previously been the case. Our investigation of a large sample of listed Chinese companies finds that a significant increase in the extent of related-party disclosure occurred after the introduction of The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China (The Code). This suggests that The Code issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission have worked as ‘soft’ corporate directives as well as insisting on legally enforceable mandatory disclosure requirements, to effectively improve the extent of corporate disclosure in the sensitive area of related-party transactions
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Shan et al. (2010) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 4 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: