Reinforcing Leninist Means of Corruption Control in China: Centralization, Regulatory Changes and Party-State Integration

In the study of institutionalization in authoritarian regimes, the cryptic anticorruption institutions active in non-democratic governance are often understudied. This is largely due to the opaque intra-regime disciplinary inspection process associated with extralegal detentions, as well as the sub-rosa nature of corruption activities. Through research on the institutional implications of Xi Jinping's ongoing anti-corruption campaign, a vital effort for his power consolidation, this article aims to explain the 'authoritarian resilience' of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Based on analysis of the evolution of the CPC's anti-corruption effort in the reform era, focused on the comparison of Xi Jinping and Hu Jintao's respective anti-corruption drives and of institutional flaws in the CPC bureaucracy that stoke high-stakes corruption, the article discusses different institutional imperatives that the top leadership needs to address in a range of political contexts. It also assesses the extent to which the new methods adopted by Xi's graft-busters have been effective in addressing these challenges.