Theoretical framework demonstrates an organisational constraint for awareness models, suggesting measurable differences in cognitive capacities strictly require underlying structural changes.
This manuscript develops the Principle of Structural Dependence (PSD) as a general organisational constraint for theories and empirical models of awareness and cognitive capacities. PSD proposes that measurable differences in a capacity require corresponding differences in the organisation relevant to supporting that capacity. The principle is deliberately modest: it does not specify what consciousness fundamentally is, nor does it claim that organisational change is sufficient for a particular conscious state. Instead, it identifies structural dependence as a necessary constraint that candidate explanations of awareness should satisfy. The paper develops PSD from a conceptual principle into an operational and falsifiable framework. It defines capacity-relative supporting organisation, introduces measurement thresholds for empirical testing, addresses questions of scale and granularity, and specifies conditions under which the principle could be challenged or falsified. Evidence and potential applications are considered across anaesthesia, sleep and dreaming, disorders of consciousness, neurodegeneration, development, comparative cognition, and computational systems. Particular attention is given to perturbation-based approaches, ordered vulnerability of different capacities, recovery trajectories, and the distinction between organisational variables that are constitutively relevant and additional variables that may improve prediction without replacing structural dependence. The manuscript also examines how PSD can be used as a model-comparison constraint across competing theories of consciousness. Rather than proposing another complete theory of consciousness, PSD is intended as a higher-order principle that can generate shared empirical tests across otherwise different theoretical frameworks. PSD is related to, but not dependent upon, the authors’ previously developed C–A Framework. Within that framework, it provides a formal way of investigating how different capacities of awareness depend upon different forms and levels of organisation. Version 2 substantially strengthens the manuscript’s operational formulation, empirical testing strategy, falsification criteria, treatment of measurement and granularity, and proposed research programme.
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King et al. (2026) studied this question.
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