L. Berkowitz and E. Harmon-Jones (2004) challenge appraisal theories of emotion by describing 2 sets of conditions (physical discomfort and anger-related muscle actions) in which anger appears to be elicited in the absence of theoretically predicted appraisals. In response, the authors discuss the ability of the specific appraisal model they have developed (e.g., C. A. Smith & L. D. Kirby, 2000, 2001; C. A. Smith & R. S. Lazarus, 1990) to account for such instances of anger. First, a number of issues are clarified relevant to the authors' model, including the nature of both the cognitive operations underlying appraisal and the specific appraisals hypothesized to evoke anger. The authors then describe how their model can account for the instances of anger described by L. Berkowitz and E. Harmon-Jones and how both accounts might be tested.
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Smith et al. (2004) studied this question.
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