Sport, when seen as a valued human practice, is a form of moral education. In particular, the virtues, which help characterize and sustain sport as a practice, are central to what it is to be morally educated. This paper underpins this general position further by pointing out the inadequacies of some empirically based models in their approach to a study of moral development, especially when observed from the perspective of virtue theory and in particular, the Aristotelian concepts of phronesis and habituation. The latter approach, it is argued, provides criteria that is more complete as a basis for the formulation of a new model of what constitutes the nature of the moral so that it can be examined in a less limited way. It also provides a more satisfactory foundation for the teaching of moral education in schools. The last section is concerned with the role of the teacher of sport in this endeavor.
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Peter J. Arnold (2001) studied this question.
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