Pure Competition, Coalitional Power, and Fair Division

This article is connected with the conceptual foundations of the theory of economic competition, as well as with the respective effect of the concept of the new solution, derived from the mathematical theory of games. We will discuss the three main principle of distribution in the economic society - pure competition, coalition forces and the fair distribution - and demonstrate how they enable to form three different approaches to the solution of mathematical model of the market. Two such solutions, competitive balance and the kernel, were closely related, despite sharp differences in heuristic interpretation. Our goal is to introduce the economic analysis of the third of these decisions - the value of the game, and comparing and comparing it with the other two. As in the case with the kernel, the decision based on the value of the game assumes that the market is based on the collusion of the game, which involves many sides. Solution based on the value, however, is looking for a unique, fair compromise between all opposing interests, while the kernel just restrict "neutral territory" between uncompromising coalitions. Competitive equilibrium, in turn, does not recognize any collusion. But when the number of participants is large, it is, nevertheless, can be demonstrated under quite general conditions, under which all three types of decisions agrees, predicting the same result, but due to various reasons.