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Albert O. Hirschman's model of ‘exit and voice’ postulates a see-saw mechanism between the two options, hence permitting the argument that emigration can be a key factor for regime stability. Analysis of the Cuban case shows the fruitfulness of this approach, but also the need to move beyond its initial postulates in two important ways. Comparison of the decisive role exit played in the demise of the GDR to the rather stabilizing impact of even mass emigration in Cuba points to the importance of the modalities, not the sheer numbers of exit, particularly whether or not the state is able to secure its ‘gatekeeper role’ regarding emigration. In addition, the increasing transnationalization of exit and voice challenges the supposed see-saw mechanism between the two. Exit is not the clear-cut dichotomous variable often assumed, but can lead to the externalization of voice, which despite its de-location remains part of the politics in the country of origin. At the same time, even despite political opposition to a regime, exit can generate crucial economic support through the flow of remittances in transnational emigrant networks.
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Bert Hoffmann (2005) studied this question.
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