Defensive Doping

Most philosophically informed definitions of cheating recognize the essential elements of cheating as a means of gaining a disallowed advantage over other participants in an activity (Gert, 1973; Green, 2004; Loland, 2005; Wertz, 1981). This is one condition out of four that together constitute a sufficient and coherent definition of cheating. These definitions are created because cheating is malum in se, and a proper understanding of what cheating is brings precision to a linguistically strong moral pejorative. But what if one engaged in cheating to mitigate the advantage sought by an initial cheater? Can we say that an athlete who dopes subsequent to doping by a competitor is not cheating, or possibly engaged in a virtuous or at least permissible form of cheating? This article examines the established arguments for and against this proposition as well as some objections to the idea of “two wrongs making a right” from the author.