Secularism and National Identity in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan

Most studies relating to the issue of religion in Azerbaijan have been interested in studying religion, politics, and society, as well as the nature of the Islamic revival in post-Soviet Azerbaijan with only scant reference to secularism, its nature, and its role in shaping modern Azerbaijan. This insufficient interest is quite striking, considering that dünyǝvilik (secularism), literally meaning “this-worldliness,” is enshrined in the 1995 Constitution. Moreover, it is common to start any introductory textbook on Azerbaijan by referring to the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) (1918–1920) as “the first secular and democratic republic in the Muslim world.”1 This surprising lack of interest in the significance of secularism in post-Soviet Azerbaijan may be related to two factors. First, it seems that the short-lived (23 months) ADR and its secular character have been overshadowed by subsequent longevity of the secular Republic of Turkey, which was established in 1923. Secondly, the important role of secularism in Azerbaijan has been sacrificed to the a priori assumptions of both the post-Soviet transition literature and the challenges against the secularization paradigm in the social sciences. Post-Soviet studies have focused on the meanings attributed to religion and have predominantly discussed the potential for religion to become a) a source of unity in times of transition, war, and turmoil; b) a source of political opposition; or c) the foundation of Islamic fundamentalism and/or radicalism. The main assumption is that Azerbaijani society is predominantly Muslim, therefore Islam would automatically become a major component of national identity. Yet the opposite case has also been considered in some other works, which see national identity in the early years of transition with reference to the rediscovery of ethnic identity (i.e., Turkish identity) rather than religious identity.2 Indeed, the Soviet regime left no room for religion, confining it to the private realm and permitting it to operate as popular Islam, consisting of the veneration of saints and visits to shrines. Both arguments fall short of problematizing the place of religion in national identity in post-Soviet Azerbaijan. Increasing challenges against the secularization paradigm have claimed that religion is not a declining force.3 In fact, it is more present than ever in the post-Cold War world though others such as Casanova and Taylor have drawn our attention to different dimensions of secularization still relevant to our world.4