Enough and as Good Left for Others

In ?27 of the Second Treatise of Government,l John Locke puts forward his account of how a man may legitimately appropriate goods from the state of nature for his private use by mixing his labour with them: Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other Men. For this Labour being the unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is once joyned to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others (my italics). But what if there is not enough and as good left in common for others? Does that mean nobody may appropriate anything from the state of nature and call it his private property? In other words, is the italicized clause intended as a necessary condition on private appropriation, restricting the appropriation of goods to circumstances in which there is plenty left for everybody else? Certainly it appears to be the unanimous opinion of Locke's interpreters and critics that the clause in question (I shall call it the 'enough and as good' clause) is intended as a restriction on acquisition.2 The usual story is that Locke imposed two restrictions on acquisition (the 'enough and as