What does this research mean for the field?

Guaranteed exit rights within a free movement alliance deter war by imposing endogenous population-exit costs on aggressors, an effect that is amplified by alliance size and is most effective in democracies and hybrid regimes. Novelty: ClaimNovelty.METHODOLOGICAL. Consensus alignment: ConsensusAlignment.ESTABLISHES_NEW_DIRECTION.

What question did this study set out to answer?

Formulate a formal game-theoretic framework to evaluate whether guaranteed wartime exit rights and free-movement coalitions can deter military aggression by imposing endogenous population-loss costs on aggressor states.

August 22, 2026Open Access

Exit Rights, Free Movement Alliances, and Game-Theoretic War Deterrence

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Authors

LGLukas GeigerOldham Council

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Implication

Game-theoretic modeling shows that guaranteed exit rights deter military aggression in free movement alliances, indicating that mobile populations create economic disincentives for war.

Key Points

Formulate a formal game-theoretic framework to evaluate whether guaranteed wartime exit rights and free-movement coalitions can deter military aggression by imposing endogenous population-loss costs on aggressor states.
Constructed a multi-stage game-theoretic model of coalition formation and war deterrence grounded in selectorate theory, migration economics, and Kantian peace philosophy.
Derived subgame-perfect Nash equilibria across varying regime types, coalition sizes, and resource endowments to assess stability and deterrence thresholds.
Guaranteed exit rights reduce incentives for war by imposing endogenous population-exit costs, though open exit rights alone are insufficient across all parameter spaces.
Alliance expansion past a critical mass accelerates deterrence via combined sanctions and mobility gains, with resource-poor states experiencing higher marginal accession benefits.
Deterrence mechanisms function most effectively in democracies and hybrid regimes, facing structural limits in closed autocracies with small winning coalitions.

Cite This Study

Lukas Geiger (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6a895f2aca7ade938187da83 https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22011231

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Implication

Game-theoretic modeling shows that guaranteed exit rights deter military aggression in free movement alliances, indicating that mobile populations create economic disincentives for war.

Exit Rights, Free Movement Alliances, and Game-Theoretic War Deterrence

Discussion

Member takes

Implication

Key Points

Cite This Study

Exit Rights, Free Movement Alliances, and Game-Theoretic War Deterrence

Discussion

Member takes

Implication

Key Points

Cite This Study

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