Who Can Deliver the Next Step? Distributed Capability Bargaining and the Politics of Execution

Political agreements often assume that actors able to negotiate an outcome can also deliver it. Yet in security- and technology-intensive settings, authority to agree may be separated from control over the functions required for execution. This article develops Distributed Capability Bargaining (DCB), a bounded meso-level theory of political executability. DCB explains when control over execution becomes bargaining power: an actor becomes necessary to a political transition when it autonomously controls a critical function that cannot be functionally substituted within the relevant execution window. This condition can redistribute bargaining weight, expand the set of necessary participants, and constrain what a centralized political agreement can reliably deliver. The argument integrates but remains distinct from research on partial implementation, veto players, third-party leverage, network chokepoints, and control rights by specifying a transition-specific causal sequence linking critical function, autonomous control, timely substitutability, behavioral effect, and execution boundary. Using evidence through 10 August 2026, the article traces the mature mechanism in Ukraine and uses Taiwan and Hormuz as structured comparative probes of earlier temporal stages. The comparison shows that anticipatory restructuring can precede mature bargaining effects, while activated disruption can generate functional fragmentation before necessary participation stabilizes. Formally bilateral agreements may therefore remain functionally multilateral in execution.