Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
Recently, critics such as Robert Segal and Russell McCutcheon have offered trenchant critiques of phenomenology of religion and recommended its dismissal as a method for religious studies. While acknowledging the warrantability of their criticisms, I argue that such a reorganization of the discipline would truncate the study of religion. Drawing on the work of other scholars who have sought to clarify phenomenology of religion, I suggest three ways in which phenomenology of religion may be reinterpreted and thereby retrieved as a viable method for the study of religion. I characterize phenomenology of religion as a distinctly interpretive approach to the study of religious experience and consciousness, which makes no claims concerning the sui generis or essential nature of religion, and which uses historical evidence as a guide to interpretation of religious consciousness. Understood in this fashion, phenomenology of religion has a necessary, but not exclusive, role to play in religious studies.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Jason N. Blum (2012) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: