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Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have emerged as relay nodes to alleviate multi-user traffic congestion in wireless communication networks due to their flexibility, fast deployment and line-of-sight links. However, the selfish attribute of both users and UAVs presents significant challenges to the efficient participation of UAVs in multiple relay tasks, particularly with conflicting profit objectives. In this article, we propose a double auction-based incentive mechanism that incentivizes UAVs to engage in relay tasks while achieving a strategic trade-off between network throughput and market fairness. Specifically, UAVs (sellers) provide relay services to ground users (buyers), with base station acting as an auctioneer responsible for matching user and UAV, charging fees from users, and giving payments to UAVs. The presence of heterogeneous users and UAVs complicates the relay tasks processing. Additionally, designing an effective payment strategy that meets economic properties further exacerbates the difficulty. To address these challenges, we propose a throughput maximization algorithm to enhance network communication efficiency and design a winner and pricing determination algorithm to establish a reasonable market. The simulation results demonstrate that our mechanism achieves higher transaction quantity than benchmark schemes (McAfee, Candidate critical pair, and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)), motivating UAVs to participate in relay tasks for users.
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Qiu et al. (2025) studied this question.
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