Philosophical analysis shows how requests create practical reasons across social relationships, indicating that treating requests as reasons improves moral duty compliance.
By issuing requests of one another, we wield what is, on reflection, a remarkable power: to create reasons at will. But how can requesters give us reasons to do what they want, even when they stand in no relation of authority over us? And what would be lost if we saw requests as communicating the existence of pre‐existing reasons, rather than creating new ones? I propose that a request creates a reason when and because treating such requests as reasons would help the addressee to comply better with their duties. I show that this view explains how requests create reasons, why requesting is valuable, and how the reasons created by requests depend on antecedent considerations. I argue, further, that this view clarifies the discretionary nature of the reasons created by requests, gives a unified account of how requests create reasons among intimates and strangers, and reveals important forms of unfairness that result from requests.
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Milan Mossé (2026) studied this question.
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