Why the study?
A recent containment breach of wild poliovirus type 2 at a vaccine manufacturing site prompted a review of facility-associated poliovirus releases to address risks for the posteradication era.
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Population
Facility-associated releases of polioviruses into communities reported over >8 decades
Design
Review
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Stringent containment measures at laboratories and vaccine production sites are essential to prevent the reintroduction of poliovirus into communities in the post-eradication era.
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative continues to make progress toward the eradication target. Indigenous wild poliovirus (WPV) type 2 was last detected in 1999, WPV type 3 was last detected in 2012, and over the past 2 years WPV type 1 has been detected only in parts of 2 countries (Afghanistan and Pakistan). Once the eradication of poliomyelitis is achieved, infectious and potentially infectious poliovirus materials retained in laboratories, vaccine production sites, and other storage facilities will continue to pose a risk for poliovirus reintroduction into communities. The recent breach in containment of WPV type 2 in an inactivated poliovirus vaccine manufacturing site in the Netherlands prompted this review, which summarizes information on facility-associated release of polioviruses into communities reported over >8 decades. Successful polio eradication requires the management of poliovirus containment posteradication to prevent the consequences of the reestablishment of poliovirus transmission.
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Bandyopadhyay et al. (2019) studied this question.
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