The Case Against ‘Dance Objects’

It is generally assumed that works in the performance arts are objects. They are not physical objects, of course, but abstract objects of some kind. Such abstract objects are made available to us through the activities of composers, playwrights, choreographers and dance companies, and are appreciable through performance events. Dance objects in a strict sense, it is assumed, are such abstract objects. And, it is further assumed, such abstract objects are properly thought of as types which have particular performance events as their tokens. Dance inherits this ontological picture from classical music, where it is the central element in what I have termed the ‘classical paradigm’. I begin by briefly sketching the classical paradigm as it applies to musical works and performances, and the reasons it has been widely assumed to be ‘the only game in town’. I then present what I take to be powerful objections to the classical paradigm in its ‘pure’ form, and some desiderata for any adequate philosophical account of works in a performing art. I sketch what I take to be the most plausible strategy for defending a ‘type’ theory of works in the performing arts, Jerrold Levinson’s view of musical works as ‘initiated types’. I then argue that this view as its stands fails to account for one very significant desideratum, but might be amended so as to address this challenge. I consider here Anna Pakes’ account of dance works in her Choreography Invisible. I suggest, however, that any account of dance works as types, pure or ‘initiated’, faces serious difficulties. Finally, drawing on Wollheim’s account of multiple artworks as ‘types’, I offer an alternative account of dance works that does not commit us to works as abstract objects, and that thus denies that there are dance objects in the strict sense.