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Survey experiment reveals limited resonance of official Islam narratives in Kyrgyzstan, suggesting top-down religious messaging can be counterproductive.
Scholars of Muslim-majority countries (MMCs) have paid renewed attention to government efforts to impose an “official Islam” (OI) to combat what they regard as religious extremism. Yet, understanding when OI resonates with the public has received less scrutiny. We bridge the literature on OI with the broader literature on state narratives to derive a set of hypotheses, which we test using an original survey with an embedded experiment in Kyrgyzstan—an MMC that has promoted an OI since the 2010s. Our results suggest that OI’s resonance is limited and potentially counterproductive. The state promotes traditional Kyrgyz Islam as the only version that is compatible with both national identity and personal piety. While the narrative concerning identity resonates with most of the population, key constituencies appear to reject the narrative concerning personal piety—the ethnic majority (Kyrgyz), largest ethnic minority (Uzbeks), and those with high degrees of religiosity and political trust.
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Luong et al. (2026) studied this question.
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