This article estimates the effect of fuel quality monitoring and the inspection programs performed by the Brazilian National Agency of Petroleum (Agência Nacional do Petróleo - ANP) on the quality of fuel sold in Brazil. The research mainly uses microdata extracted from the Fuel Quality Monitoring Program (FQMP), which has characteristics of a random experiment, and also the Inspection Program, a typical example of command-and-control regulation. It is verified through an instrumental-variable estimation that monitoring and inspection activities employed by the ANP effectively reduce the likelihood that gas stations will commercialize non-compliance fuels. The results prove that either traditional or alternative deterrent methods can improve the engagement of economic agents concerning fuel quality, increasing the probability that a gas station sells fuels with less polluting potential.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Marcelo Vitor Martins de Meneses (2025) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 5 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: