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September 2, 2026GovernanceOpen Access

Social Norms, State Punishment, and Motivation Crowding in Anti‐Corruption Messaging: Experimental Evidence From China

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Authors

FYFeng YangLZLin Zhu

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Overview

Survey experiment demonstrates that correcting misperceptions of corruption tolerance strengthens civic resistance, indicating legal punishment cues can crowd out normative motivation.

Key Points

  • Determine whether correcting exaggerated public perceptions of social tolerance for corruption bolsters anti-corruption attitudes, and assess how state enforcement cues moderate this response.
  • Conducted a large-scale survey experiment evaluating participants' perceptions of peer corruption tolerance and subsequent anti-corruption intentions.
  • Delivered informational treatments providing actual data on societal intolerance of corruption, evaluated independently and alongside state punishment cues.
  • Providing factual information showing low societal tolerance for corruption significantly increased anti-corruption attitudes and intentions, showing the largest gains among those with initial misperceptions.
  • Combining social norm corrections with state punishment cues attenuated the intervention's positive impact, demonstrating that enforcement messaging can crowd out intrinsic social motivation.

Cite This Study

Yang et al. (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6a97e25ec562ede874ec6709https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.70151
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