Simulation calibration demonstrates stabilized net operating income in autonomous pricing markets, indicating hardware-enforced rate floors mitigate computational exploitation risk.
Autonomous pricing agents transact against one another at machine speed in perishable inventory markets. The governance layer meant to restrain them is still written as software intent, and software intent is a property of whichever model happens to hold it, so enforcement weakens precisely as counterparty capability strengthens. We remove that dependence through four tiers: AKIF gates inbound market state on type, provenance, and range; BVEF converts resource stocks into a biophysical occupancy ceiling; the Detektor Safe Harness runs a filter over cross agent rate correlation; and a YEP kernel composes all three into a single rate floor. That floor is sealed inside a hardware isolated enclave at attestation, after which no write path to it exists. Proposition 1 establishes that attainable violation of the rate floor is constant in adversary capability. A 237 key resort calibration moves fifth percentile net operating income from minus 0.179 million to plus 0.901 million USD and cuts the probability of negative NOI from 6.14 percent to 0.01 percent. What remains is physical risk, not computational risk.
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Gayan Nugawela (2026) studied this question.
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